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(57) ABSTRACT 
A transmitter device (HOT) for secure communication 
includes: an encoder (170) configured to apply a non-system-
atic error correcting code (NS ECC) to a message, thus pro-
ducing encoded bits with no clear message bits; and a trans-
ceiver (720) configured to transmit the encoded bits over a 
main channel to a receiver. A method for secure communica-
tion includes: encoding a message with an NS ECC to pro-
duce an encoded message carrying no message bits in the 
clear; and transmitting the encoded message over a main 
channel (120). The NS ECC characteristics result in an eaves-
dropper channel error probability under a security threshold 
(320) and a main channel error probability over a reliability 
threshold (310), whenever an eavesdropper (140) listening on 
an eavesdropper channel (150) is more than distance Z (220) 
from the transmitter. Unreliable bits in the encoded bits ren-
der the eavesdropper unable to reliably decode messages on 
the main channel. 
NOISE 
130 
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SECURE COMMUNICATION USING 
NON-SYSTEMATIC ERROR CONTROL 
CODES 
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED 
APPLICATION 
This application is a co-pending application which claims 
priority to PCT Application No. PCT /US2009/5997 4, filed, 8 
Oct. 2009, entitled "Secure Communication Using Non-Sys-
tematic Error Control Codes" which claims priority to U.S. 
Patent Application No. 61/103,951, filed on 9 Oct. 2008 each 
of these applications being incorporated herein by reference 
in their entirety. 
STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY 
SPONSORED RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT 
2 
channel. The NS ECC has a set of defined characteristics such 
that when the eavesdropper device is more than a predeter-
mined distance Z from the transmitter, at least a predefined 
fraction of the message is unreliable. The predefined fraction 
of unreliable bits renders the eavesdropper unable to reliably 
decode messages on the main channel. 
Also disclosed is a transmitter for secure communication in 
a system involving the transmitter device, a receiver device, 
and an eavesdropper device. The transmitter device transmits 
10 to the receiver device on a main channel. The eavesdropper 
device listening on an eavesdropper channel to the transmitter 
device. The main channel has a signal-to-noise ratio SNRM, 
and the eavesdropper channel has a signal-to-noise ratio 
15 SNRr The transmitter comprises: an encoder configured to 
apply a non-systematic error correcting code (NS ECC) to a 
message, thus producing a plurality of encoded bits that 
includes no clear bits from the message; and a transceiver 
configured to transmit the encoded plurality of bits to the This invention was made with Govermnent support under 
Agreement/Contract Number CCF-0634952, awarded by 20 
National Science Foundation. The Government has certain 
receiver over the main channel. The NS ECC has a set of 
defined characteristics such that when the eavesdropper 
device is more than a predetermined distance Z from the 
transmitter, a bit error probability on the eavesdropper chan-
nel does not exceed a predetermined security threshold while 
rights in the invention. 
FIELD OF THE DISCLOSURE 
The present disclosure relates to data communication, and 
more specifically, to secure communication using non-sys-
tematic error control codes. 
BACKGROUND 
The conventional method of providing secure communica-
tion over a channel uses cryptography. Cryptography relies 
25 a bit error probability on the main channel does exceed a 
predetermined reliability threshold, the plurality of encoded 
bits including a fraction of unreliable bits which render the 
eavesdropper unable to reliably decode messages on the main 
channel. 
30 Also disclosed is a system for secure communication. The 
system comprises: a receiver device; and a transmitter device 
in communication with the receiver device over a main chan-
nel. The transmitter device is configured to communicate all 
bits of an original message without transmitting any of the 
35 bits in the clear, by applying a non-systematic error correcting 
code (NS ECC) and transmitting only a portion of the 
encoded bits. The receiver device is configured to recover all 
bits of the original message from the transmitted encoded 
bits. The NS ECC has a set of defined characteristics such that 
on the existence of codes that are "hard to break": that is, 
one-way functions that are believed to be computationally 
infeasible to invert. Cryptography has become increasingly 
more vulnerable to an increase in computing power and to the 
development of more efficient attacks. Furthermore, the 
assumptions about the hardness of certain one-way functions 
have not been proven mathematically, so cryptography is 40 
vulnerable if these assumptions are incorrect. 
when an eavesdropper device listening on an eavesdropper 
channel to the transmitter device is more than a predeter-
mined distance Z from the transmitter, a bit error probability 
on the eavesdropper channel does not exceed a predetermined 
security threshold while a bit error probability on the main 
Another weakness of cryptography is the lack of no precise 
metrics or absolute comparisons between various crypto-
graphic algorithms, showing the trade off between reliability 
and security as a function of the block length of plaintext and 45 
ciphertext messages. Instead, a particular cryptographic algo-
rithm is considered "secure" if it survives a defined set of 
attacks, or "insecure" if it does not. 
channel does exceed a predetermined reliability threshold. 
The encoded message including a fraction of unreliable bits 
which render the eavesdropper unable to reliably decode the 
message on the main channel. 
Cryptography as applied to some media (e.g., wireless 
networks) also requires a trusted third party as well as com- 50 
plex protocols and system architectures. Therefore, a need 
exists for these and other problems to be addressed. 
Also disclosed is a transmitter device for secure commu-
nication in a system involving the transmitter device, a 
receiver device, and an eavesdropper device. The transmitter 
device transmits to the receiver device on a main channel. The 
eavesdropper device listens on an eavesdropper channel to the 
transmitter device. The main channel has a signal-to-noise SUMMARY 
Disclosed herein are systems and methods for secure com-
munication. One such method is performed in a system 
involving a transmitter device, a receiver device, and an 
eavesdropper device. The transmitter device transmits to a 
receiver device on a main channel. The eavesdropper device 
listens on an eavesdropper channel to the transmitter device. 
The main channel has a signal-to-noise ratio SNRM, and the 
eavesdropper channel has a signal-to-noise ratio SN Rr This 
method includes: encoding a message with a non-systematic 
error correcting code (NS ECC) to produce an encoded mes-
sage carrying no bits of the message in the clear; and trans-
mitting the encoded message to the receiver over the main 
55 ratio SNRM and the eavesdropper channel has a signal-to-
noise ratio SNRr The transmitter device comprises: a physi-
cal layer component of a protocol stack, and an RF trans-
ceiver. The physical layer component is configured to receive 
a message from another component of a protocol stack that is 
60 logically located above the physical layer component in the 
protocol stack. The physical layer component comprises an 
encoder. The encoder is configured to apply a non-systematic 
error correcting code (NS ECC) to the message, thus produc-
ing a plurality of encoded bits that includes no clear bits from 
65 the message. The RF transceiver is configured to transmit the 
encoded plurality of bits to the receiver over the main chan-
nel. 
US 8,667,380 B2 
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Also disclosed is an encoder residing in a transmitter 
device. The encoder provides secure communication in a 
system involving the transmitter device, a receiver device, 
and an eavesdropper device. The transmitter device transmits 
4 
to the receiver device on a main channel. The eavesdropper 
device listens on an eavesdropper channel to the transmitter 
device. The main channel has a signal-to-noise ratio SNRM 
The eavesdropper channel has a signal-to-noise ratio SNRE. 
The encoder comprises: coding logic configured to apply a 
non-systematic error correcting code (NS ECC) to a message, 10 
thus producing a plurality of encoded bits that includes no 
clear bits from the message; and puncture logic configured to 
puncture at least a portion of the encoded bits and to provide 
the punctured bits for transmission over the main channel. 
The NS ECC jas a set of defined characteristics such that 15 
when the eavesdropper device is more than a predetermined 
distance Z from the transmitter, a bit error probability on the 
eavesdropper channel does not exceed a predetermined secu-
rity threshold while a bit error probability on the main channel 
does exceed a predetermined reliability threshold. The plu- 20 
rality of encoded bits includes a fraction of unreliable bits 
which render the eavesdropper unable to reliably decode mes-
sages on the main channel. 
transmissions on main channel 120, over an eavesdropper 
channel 150. Eavesdropper channel 150 is subject to a noise 
input 160. Eavesdropper 140 is passive with respect to main 
channel 120, i.e., eavesdropper 140 does not jam main chan-
nel 120, insert bits on main channel 120, etc. In some embodi-
ments, main channel 120 and eavesdropper channel 150 are 
wireless. In one of these embodiments, transmitter llOT 
takes the form of a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag. 
In still other embodiments, main channel 120 and eavesdrop-
per channel 150 are wired (wireline) channels. 
The embodiments described herein utilize non-systematic 
error correcting codes to insure communication between 
friendly parties that is both reliable and secure, by taking 
advantage of environments in which main channel 120 (the 
channel between "friendly" and a "friendly" receiver) always 
has positive secrecy capacity. Positive secrecy capacity is 
assured when the eavesdropper is more than a certain distance 
away from the friendly transmitter, thus guaranteeing that the 
signal quality on the message channel is better than the signal 
quality on the eavesdropper channel. 
In the real world, this assumption is perhaps most reason-
able when the distance between friendly transmitter and the 
friendly receiver is on the order of a few meters. One non-
limiting example of such a scenario is a radio frequency 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
Many aspects of the disclosure can be better understood 
with reference to the following drawings. The components in 
the drawings are not necessarily to scale, emphasis instead 
being placed upon clearly illustrating the principles of the 
present disclosure. 
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a transmitter device and a 
receiver device utilizing non-systematic error correcting 
codes, according to some embodiments described herein. 
FIG. 2 is a diagram of an example configuration for the 
transmitter and receiver of FIG. 1, according to some embodi-
ments described herein. 
FIG. 3 is a graph illustrating performance of a non-system-
atic ECC, according to embodiments described herein. 
FIGS. 4A and 4B are graphs illustrating performance of a 
non-systematic ECC as compared to a systematic ECC, 
according to embodiments described herein. 
FIG. 5 is a logical block diagram of a system with a secure 
physical layer, according to some embodiments described 
herein. 
FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating selected components 
of a secure physical layer from FIG. 5, according to some 
embodiments described herein. 
FIG. 7 is a hardware block diagram of a device from FIG. 
1, according to some embodiments described herein. 
FIG. 8 is a hardware block diagram of another device from 
FIG. 1, according to some embodiments described herein. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a transmitter device and a 
receiver device utilizing non-systematic error correcting 
codes to provide secure communication. System 100 includes 
two "friendly parties": device llOT, operating as a transmit-
ter; and llOR, operating as a receiver. A person of ordinary 
skill in the art would understand that some embodiments of 
device 110 are have both transmitter and receiver functional-
ity. Transmitter llOT and receiver llOR are in communica-
tion over a main channel 120, which is subject to a noise input 
130. 
System 100 also includes another device 140 (an "eaves-
dropper") which is capable oflistening to (eavesdropping on) 
25 identification (RFID) tag transmitting to a RFID reader. In 
such cases, an eavesdropper that is on the order of tens of 
meters away from the friendly transmitter has a signal quality 
that is hundreds of times worse than that of the main message 
channel (since the signal power is proportional to the square 
30 of the distance). However, the techniques described herein are 
applicable in any scenario where the message channel has 
positive secrecy capacity. The laws of physics guarantee that 
the signal quality will be lower for the eavesdropper as long as 
the eavesdropper is physically farther than a certain distance 
35 away from the friendly transmitter than the friendly receiver 
is. The relative antenna sizes of the friendly parties and the 
eavesdropper determine the specific distance between the 
eavesdropper and the friendly transmitter that is required for 
positive secrecy capacity to be obtained. In other words, the 
40 techniques described below can guarantee a perfect secrecy 
zone of size Z around the friendly transmitter, given a specific 
set of antenna sizes. 
Transmitter llOT includes an encoder 170 which applies 
one or more non-systematic error correcting codes (ECC) 
45 during message transmission. Receiver llOR includes a 
complementary decoder 180. As should be known to a person 
of ordinary skill in the art, an ECC generates blocks of coded 
bits (codewords) from blocks of message (data) bits. As the 
term is used herein, an ECC is described as "systematic" 
50 when all message bits of a k-bit message are present and 
unchanged in some k positions of the codeword, i.e., the 
message bits are carried in the clear (as plaintext). Thus, 
codewords produced by a systematic ECC provide error cor-
rection, but not security. In contrast, an ECC is described as 
55 "non-systematic" when no message bits are carried in the 
clear, and every bit in the codeword is instead a function of the 
message bits. In this manner, non-systematic ECCs provide 
security because the decoder must perform an operation on 
the codeword to recover the message bits. Thus, non-system-
60 atic ECC encoder 170 cooperates with non-systematic ECC 
decoder 180 to provide secure communication over main 
channel 120. 
Some embodiments of non-systematic ECC encoder 170 
"puncture" (remove) all message bits. Other embodiments 
65 use a code in which every codeword bit is a sum of at least two 
message bits. Other embodiments use a code in which every 
codeword bit is a function of at least two message bits. Per-
US 8,667,380 B2 
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sons of ordinary skill in the art should appreciate other tech-
niques which result in no message bits being carried in the 
clear, and all such variations are intended to be within the 
scope of this disclosure. 
The non-systematic error correcting coding techniques dis-
closed herein can be used to exploit the channel characteris-
tics present when transmitter HOT and receiver HOR are 
relatively close to each other. As shown in FIG. 2, in this 
configuration the distance from transmitter HOT to receiver 
HOR (shown as 210) is much smaller than the distance from 10 
transmitter HOT to receiver HOR to eavesdropper 140 
(shown as (220). Therefore, the signal-to-noise ratio on main 
channel 120 (SNRM) is betterthan the signal-to-noise ratio on 
eavesdropper charmel 150 (SNRE), as a person of ordinary 15 
skill in the art would appreciate from basic communications 
theory. 
The non-systematic error correcting coding techniques dis-
closed herein can exploit this channel property to insure that 
information on main channel 120 remains secret from eaves- 20 
dropper charmel 150 while also providing high reliability on 
main charmel 120. A non-systematic ECC used by encoder 
170 and decoder 180 provides a perfect secrecy zone 210 
within a given distance Z from transmitter HOT. In the 
example configuration shown in FIG. 2, perfect secrecy zone 25 
210 is a circle, so that Z is the radius of that circle. Outside 
6 
eavesdropper 140, respectively.) These code characteristics 
will now be described in further detail in connection with 
FIG. 3, FIG. 4A and FIG. 4B. 
FIG. 3 describes a non-systematic ECC used by an 
example embodiment of encoder 170 in terms of bit error rate 
(BER) performance vs. SNR. As can be seen in the graph of 
FIG. 3, for a given expected SNR on main channel 120 
(SNRM), the example non-systematic ECC produces a bit 
error rate (on main channel 120) which exceeds a predeter-
mined reliability threshold 310. For a given expected SNR on 
eavesdropper channel 150, the same non-systematic ECC 
produces a bit error rate (eavesdropper channel 150) which is 
less than a predetermined security threshold 320. The non-
systematic ECC used by non-systematic ECC encoder 170 
could thus be described as exhibiting a sharp waterfall region 
(sharp drop off between reliability threshold 310 and security 
threshold 320) as well as high BER at low SNRs. The steep 
increase in BER seen in FIG. 3 is a result of not transmitting 
any message bits in the clear and instead using the codeword 
to hide all information about the message bits. 
Various embodiments of encoder 170 achieve a larger or 
smaller perfect secrecy zone 210 by using a non-systematic 
ECC with a slightly different SNR vs. BER curve. For 
example, a larger perfect secrecy zone 210 is achieved by 
using a code which has a lower BER at a high SNR as 
compared to FIG. 3, i.e., reliability threshold 310 moves to the 
right. Codes that provide a larger secrecy zone may be rela-
tively complex. A smaller perfect secrecy zone 210 is 
perfect secrecy zone 210, the signal-to-noise ratio on eaves-
dropper channel 150 (SNRE) results in a bit error rate on 
eavesdropper channel 150 (BERE) that is high enough to 
guarantee that a specific percentage of the bits obtained from 
transmissions by transmitter HOT are unreliable. Non-sys-
tematic ECC encoder 170 and non-systematic ECC decoder 
180 use a non-systematic ECC, which is designed to ensure 
that this unreliable information renders eavesdropper 140 
unable to reliably decode messages sent on main charmel 120. 
A suitably designed non-systematic ECC ensures that the bit 
error rate experienced by the eavesdropper is higher than the 
30 
achieved by using a code in which reliability threshold 310 
moves to the left as compared to FIG. 3. 
FIGS. 4A and 4B are graphs illustrating relative perfor-
mance of a non-systematic ECC and a systematic ECC using 
35 a logarithmic scale and a linear scale, respectively. In linearly 
scaled FIG. 4A, curve 410 is a plot of BER vs. SNR for a 
systematic ECC, while curve 420 is a plot of BER vs. SNR for 
a non-systematic ECC. In logarithmically scaled FIG. 4B, 
curve 430 is a plot of BER vs. SNR for a systematic ECC, bit error rate produced by a conventional error correcting 
code. In fact, persons of ordinary skill in the art should appre-
ciate that Sharmon's information theory can be used to show 
the existence, in certain situations, of non-systematic ECCs 
that make the reliability of the eavesdropper's information as 
low as possible. In various embodiments, a non-systematic 
ECC used by encoder 170 is based on a linear block code, is 45 
a turbo code, or is a low density parity check code. 
40 while curve 440 is a plot of BER vs. SNR for a non-systematic 
ECC. 
As can be seen in both FIGS. 4A and 4B, a non-systematic 
ECC exhibits a much steeper increase in the BER as the SNR 
on main charmel 120 decreases, a property that provides 
message security as long as all unauthorized eavesdroppers 
operate at a lower SNR than legitimate users. Specifically, a 
relatively small impairment of the SNRresults in BERs of0.4 
and above, such that an eavesdropper is unable to extract 
much useful information from the received signal. In contrast, 
FIGS. 4A and 4B illustrate that when a systematic ECC is 
used, such a high BER on eavesdropper channel 150 requires 
the eavesdropper to operate at a significantly lower SNR. 
A person of ordinary skill in the art would thus understand 
from the graphs in FIG. 3, FIG. 4A, and FIG. 4B that in some 
embodiments, these predefined characteristics are such that 
when the eavesdropper device is more than a predetermined 
distance Z from the transmitter, at least a predefined portion 
of the message is unreliable. This predefined portion of unre-
liable bits renders the eavesdropper unable to reliably decode 
Some embodiments of device HO support a number of 
different non-systematic ECCs, which allows flexibility in 
the level of security that is required against an eavesdropper. 
For example, the particular non-systematic ECC that is cho- 50 
sen or selected for use by non-systematic ECC encoder 170 
can be less complex if it is known that the eavesdropper is 
more than a certain distance away, since this distance affects 
the error rate on the charmel. Some embodiments of device 
HO adapt to changing channel conditions by dynamically 55 
selecting an appropriate non-systematic ECC. Still other 
embodiments use a non-systematic ECC when eavesdropper 
channel 150 is not much noisier than main charmel 120, while 
switching to a systematic ECC when eavesdropper channel 
150 becomes much noisier than main charmel 120. 60 messages on the main charmel. Such a person would also 
understand from these graphs that in other embodiments, 
these predefined characteristics are such that when the eaves-
dropper device is more than a predetermined distance Z from 
the transmitter, the bit error probability on the eavesdropper 
To create a situation where the eavesdropper's information 
is unreliable, non-systematic ECC encoder 170 and non-
systematic ECC decoder 180 use a non-systematic ECC 
designed to have specific properties or characteristics related 
to SNRM and SNRE. (As discussed earlier, SNRM and SNRE 
are tum related to the distance between transmitter HOT and 
receiver HOR, and the distance from transmitter HOT to 
65 channel does not exceed a predetermined security threshold, 
while a bit error probability on the main channel does exceed 
a predetermined reliability threshold. The encoded bits 
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include some portion of bits which are unreliable, thus ren-
dering the eavesdropper unable to reliably decode messages 
on the main channel. 
8 
(QAMl 6) while the other side may transmit using quadrature 
amplitude modulation with 64 different symbols (QAM64). 
FIG. 7 is a hardware block diagram of an embodiment of 
device 110 in which encoder 170 and decoder 180 are imple-
mented in software, that is, as instructions stored in a memory 
and executed by a suitable microprocessor, digital signal pro-
cessor, network processor, microcontroller, etc. Device 110 
contains a number of components that are well known in the 
art of data communications, including a processor 710, an RF 
FIG. 5 is a logical block diagram of a system 500 with a 
secure physical layer, according to some embodiments. Sys-
tem 500 includes transmitter 11 OT and receiver 11 OR, each of 
which includes secure physical layer 510, link layer 520, and 
additional layer 530. System 500 takes advantage of the pres-
ence of non-systematic ECC encoder 170, which provides 
security, within physical layer 510. This security provided at 
the physical layer obviates the need for cryptographic algo-
rithms at a higher layer. In contrast, conventional communi-
cation systems provide security by employing symmetric 
and/or asymmetric cryptographic algorithms which are 
implemented at a layer above the physical layer (e.g., wired 
equivalent privacy (WEP) at the media access control (MAC) 
layer, internet protocol security (IPSec) at the network layer, 
secure sockets layer (SSL) at the application layer, etc. 
10 transceiver 720, memory 730, and non-volatile storage 740. 
These components are coupled via bus 750. RF transceiver 
720 may support one or more of a variety of different net-
works using various technologies, medias, speeds, etc. A 
non-limiting list of examples of wireless technologies 
15 includes: radio frequency identification (RFID) networks 
(e.g., ISO 14443, ISO 18000-6); wireless local area networks 
(e.g. IEEE 802.11, commonly known as WiFi); wireless wide 
area networks (e.g., IEEE 802.16, commonly known as 
WiMAX); wireless personal area networks (e.g., Blue-
The non-systematic ECC techniques disclosed herein do 
provide security at the physical layer, but these techniques 
can also be used in combination with any protocol layer above 
the physical layer. Thus, some embodiments of transmitter 
20 tooth™, IEEE 802.15.4) and wireless telephone networks 
(e.g., CDMA, GSM, GPRS, EDGE). 
Examples of non-volatile storage include, for example, a 
hard disk, flash RAM, flash ROM, EPROM, etc. memory 730 
contains encoder instructions 760 and/or decoder instructions 
25 770, which programs or enables processor 710 to implement 
the functions of encoder 170 and/or decoder 180. Omitted 
11 OT and receiver 11 OR include encryption at higher layers of 
the protocol stack in addition to the security provided by 
non-systematic ECC encoder 170 at the physical layer. When 
security at the physical layer combined with encryption at a 
higher layer, principles of information-theoretic security 
show that as long as the eavesdropper is more than a certain 
distance away from the friendly transmitter and receiver, the 30 
eavesdropper will necessarily have a number of errors after 
decoding and that this number of errors, when combined with 
a particular cryptographic code, will render the eavesdropper 
virtually unable to decode the message. 
FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating selected components 35 
of one embodiment of secure physical layer 510. A transmit 
secure physical layer 510T includes a framer 610, non-sys-
tematic ECC encoder 170, and a modulator 620. Framer 610 
operates on a message 605 from a higher protocol layer. 
Message 605 is a stream of bits. Framer 610 divides the bit 40 
stream into blocks, and outputs a block 615, which may 
include header and trailer information. Block 615 is encoded 
by non-systematic ECC encoder 170. Some embodiments of 
encoder 170 include puncturer 630. Non-systematic ECC 
encoder 170 produces one or more encoded bits 625. Encoded 45 
bits 625 are modulated by modulator 620 to produce symbols, 
which are transmitted over main channel 120 to a receive 
secure physical layer 510R. 
Receive secure physical layer 510R includes a demodula-
tor 640, non-systematic ECC decoder 180, and a framer 650. 50 
Symbols received on main channel 120 are mapped to bits 
645 by demodulator 640, and bits 645 are decoded by non-
systematic ECC decoder 180. The group of decoded bits 655 
is received by framer 650, which strips off header/trailer bits 
as necessary to reveal originally transmitted message 605. 55 
Message 605 may then be passed up to a higher protocol 
layer. Notably, message 605 is reconstructed without the 
transmission of any bits of the original message in the clear. 
In some embodiments, one side of the communication 
channel has less processing or computing capabilities than 60 
the other. In some embodiments, the properties of the com-
munication channel may be asymmetrical (e.g., 10 Mbit/sec 
in one direction and 1 Mbit/sec in the other). In such embodi-
ments, one side may use different modulation and/or framing 
techniques when transmitting than the other side does. As a 65 
non-limiting example, one side may transmit using quadra-
ture amplitude modulation with 16 different symbols 
from FIG. 7 are a number of conventional components, 
known to those skilled in the art, that are not necessary to 
explain the operation of device 110. 
FIG. 8 is a hardware block diagram of an embodiment of 
device 110 in which encoder 170 and decoder 180 are imple-
mented in hardware logic, as encoding logic 810 and decod-
ing logic 820. Technologies used to implement encoding 
logic 810 and decoding logic 820 include, but are not limited 
to, a programmable logic device (PLD), a programmable gate 
array (PGA), field programmable gate array (FPGA), an 
application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a system on 
chip (SoC), and a system on packet (SoP). The embodiment 
of FIG. 8 may also contain software to implement functions 
such as management, initialization of hardware, protocol 
stack layers, etc., so processor 710 and memory 730 are also 
included. Omitted from FIG. 8 are a number of conventional 
components, known to those skilled in the art, that are not 
necessary to explain the operation of device 110. In yet 
another embodiment of device 110 (not illustrated), encoder 
170 and/or decoder 180 are implemented by a combination of 
software (i.e., instructions executed on a processor) and hard-
ware logic. 
Some embodiments of encoder 170 and decoder 180 are 
stored on a computer-readable medium, which in the context 
of this disclosure refers to any structure which can contain, 
store, or embody instructions executable by a processor. The 
computer readable medium can be, for example but not lim-
ited to, based on electronic, magnetic, optical, electromag-
netic, infrared, or semiconductor technology. 
Specific examples of a computer-readable medium using 
electronic technology would include (but are not limited to) 
the following: a random access memory (RAM); a read-only 
memory (ROM); and an erasable programmable read-only 
memory (EPROM or Flash memory). A specific example 
using magnetic technology includes (but is not limited to) a 
disk drive; and a portable computer diskette. Specific 
examples using optical technology include (but are not lim-
ited to) a compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM) or a 
digital video disk read-only memory (DVD-ROM). 
Any process descriptions or blocks in flowcharts would be 
understood as representing modules, segments, or portions of 
US 8,667,380 B2 
9 
code which include one or more executable instructions for 
implementing specific functions or steps in the process. As 
would be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art of the 
software development, alternate implementations are also 
included within the scope of the disclosure. In these alternate 
implementations, functions may be executed out of order 
from that shown or discussed, including substantially concur-
rently or in reverse order, depending on the functionality 
involved. 
The foregoing description has been presented for purposes 1 o 
of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaus-
tive or to limit the disclosure to the precise forms disclosed. 
Obvious modifications or variations are possible in light of 
the above teachings. The implementations discussed, how-
ever, were chosen and described to illustrate the principles of 15 
the disclosure and its practical application to thereby enable 
one of ordinary skill in the art to utilize the disclosure in 
various implementations and with various modifications as 
are suited to the particular use contemplated. All such modi-
fications and variation are within the scope of the disclosure 20 
as determined by the appended claims when interpreted in 
accordance with the breadth to which they are fairly and 
legally entitled. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A method for secure communication in a system involv-
ing a transmitter device, a receiver device, and an eavesdrop-
per device, the transmitter device being configured to transmit 
25 
to the receiver device on a main charmel, the eavesdropper 
device being configured to listen on an eavesdropper channel 30 
to the transmitter device, the main channel having a first 
signal-to-noise ratio, the eavesdropper charmel having a sec-
ond signal-to-noise ratio, the method implemented in the 
transmitter device and comprising: 
encoding a message with a non-systematic error correcting 35 
code (NS ECC) to produce an encoded message without 
the message being carried in the clear; and 
transmitting the encoded message to the receiver device 
using the main channel; 
wherein the NS ECC has a defined characteristic such that 40 
when the eavesdropper device is more than a predeter-
mined distance from the transmitter device, at least a 
portion of the message is unable to be recovered by the 
eavesdropper device decoding the encoded message. 
10 
wherein the NS ECC has a defined characteristic such that 
when the eavesdropper device is more than a predeter-
mined distance from the transmitter device, a bit error 
probability on the eavesdropper channel does not exceed 
a predetermined security threshold while a bit error 
probability on the main charmel exceeds a predeter-
mined reliability threshold; and 
wherein a subset of the plurality of encoded bits render the 
eavesdropper device unable to accurately decode the 
message. 
6. A system for secure communication, the system com-
prising: 
a receiver device; and 
a transmitter device in communication with the receiver 
device using a main channel, the transmitter device con-
figured to communicate a message without transmitting 
any of the message in the clear by applying a non-
systematic error correcting code (NS ECC) and trans-
mitting a portion of a plurality of encoded bits for the 
message; 
wherein the receiver device is configured to recover the 
message from the plurality of encoded bits that were 
transmitted; and 
wherein the NS ECC has a defined characteristic such that 
when an eavesdropper device listening on an eavesdrop-
per charmel to the transmitter device is more than a 
predetermined distance from the transmitter, a bit error 
probability for the eavesdropper channel does not 
exceed a predetermined security threshold while a bit 
error probability for the main charmel exceeds a prede-
termined reliability threshold; and 
wherein the plurality of encoded bits includes a plurality of 
bits that render the eavesdropper unable to accurately 
decode the message. 
7. The system of claim 6, wherein the main charmel com-
prises a wireless charmel. 
8. The system of claim 6, wherein the transmitter device is 
a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag. 
9. A transmitter device for secure communication in a 
system involving the transmitter device, a receiver device, 
and an eavesdropper device, the transmitter device configured 
to transmit to the receiver device on a main channel, the 
eavesdropper device configured to listen on an eavesdropper 
channel to the transmitter device, the main charmel having a 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the message is encoded 
at a physical layer. 
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the main charmel com-
prises a wireless channel. 
45 first signal-to-noise ratio, the eavesdropper charmel having a 
second signal-to-noise ratio, the transmitter device compris-
ing: 
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the NS ECC comprises 
a low density parity check code. 50 
5. A transmitter device for secure communication in a 
system involving the transmitter device, a receiver device, 
and an eavesdropper device, the transmitter device being 
configured to transmit to the receiver device on a main chan-
nel, the eavesdropper device being configured to listen on an 55 
eavesdropper charmel to the transmitter device, the main 
channel having a first signal-to-noise ratio, the eavesdropper 
channel having a second signal-to-noise ratio, the transmitter 
device comprising: 
an encoder configured to apply a non-systematic error cor- 60 
recting code (NS ECC) to a message to produce a plu-
rality of encoded bits, wherein the plurality of encoded 
bits results in the message not being carried in the clear; 
and 
a physical layer component of a protocol stack, the physi-
cal layer component configured to receive a message 
from another component of the protocol stack, the physi-
cal layer component comprising an encoder configured 
to apply a non-systematic error correcting code (NS 
ECC) to the message to produce a plurality of encoded 
bits, the plurality of encoded bits being produced such 
that the message is not carried in the clear; and 
an RF transceiver configured to transmit the plurality of 
encoded bits to the receiver device using the main chan-
nel. 
10. An encoder residing in a transmitter device, the encoder 
providing secure communication in a system involving the 
transmitter device, a receiver device, and an eavesdropper 
device, the transmitter device being configured to transmit to 
the receiver device on a main channel, the eavesdropper 
device being configured to listen on an eavesdropper channel 
a transceiver configured to transmit the plurality of 
encoded bits to the receiver device using the main chan-
nel; 
65 to the transmitter device, the main charmel having a first 
signal-to-noise ratio, the eavesdropper charmel having a sec-
ond signal-to-noise ratio, the encoder comprising: 
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coding logic configured to apply a non-systematic error 
correcting code (NS ECC) to a message to produce a 
plurality of encoded bits such that the message is not 
carried in the clear; and 
puncture logic configured to puncture at least a portion of 5 
the plurality of encoded bits and to provide the at least a 
portion of the plurality of encoded bits that were punc-
tured for transmission over the main channel; 
wherein the NS ECC has a defined characteristic such that 
when the eavesdropper device is more than a predeter- 10 
mined distance from the transmitter device, a bit error 
probability on the eavesdropper charm el does not exceed 
a predetermined security threshold while a bit error 
probability on the main charmel exceeds a predeter-
mined reliability threshold; and 15 
wherein a subset of the plurality of encoded bits render the 
eavesdropper unable to accurately decode the message. 
11. The encoder of claim 10, wherein the NS ECC com-
prises a low density parity check code. 
12. The encoder of claim 10, wherein the puncture logic is 20 
configured to puncture all of the plurality of encoded bits. 
* * * * * 
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